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Although very uncommon, the sequential failures of all aircraft Pitot tubes, with the consequent loss of signals for all the dynamic
parameters from the Air Data System, have been found to be the cause of a number of catastrophic accidents in aviation history.
This paper proposes a robust data-driven method to detect faulty measurements of aircraft airspeed, angle of attack, and angle
of sideslip. This approach first consists in the appropriate selection of suitable sets of model regressors to be used as inputs of
neural network-based estimators to be used online for failure detection. The setup of the proposed fault detection method is
based on the statistical analysis of the residual signals in fault-free conditions, which, in turn, allows the tuning of a pair of
floating limiter detectors that act as time-varying fault detection thresholds with the objective of reducing both the false alarm
rate and the detection delay. The proposed approach has been validated using real flight data by injecting artificial ramp and
hard failures on the above sensors. The results confirm the capabilities of the proposed scheme showing accurate detection with
a desirable low level of false alarm when compared with an equivalent scheme with conventional “a priori set” fixed detection
thresholds. The achieved performance improvement consists mainly in a substantial reduction of the detection time while
keeping desirable low false alarm rates.
1. Introduction
The Air Data System (ADS) [1] is a critical component of
the conventional suite of sensors for both manned and
unmanned aircraft. The ADS provides direct measurements
of the aircraft true airspeed; typically connected with the
ADS are the vanes for measuring the important aerody-
namic angles known as angle of attack and angle of sideslip.
Since the Pitot probes and α-β vanes are installed on the
fuselage and/or wings, they are exposed to external atmo-
spheric agents; in general, these devices are robust to even
extreme weather conditions. However, there are very specific
weather conditions which can lead to peculiar ice crystals
obstructing the tiny conducts of the ADS, thus inducing
faulty sensor measurements. Incorrect measurements of air-
speed could lead to unrecoverable flight conditions, such as
in the cases of Air France Flight 447 [2] and the NASA X-
31 experimental aircraft [3]. Additional causes of crashes
included erroneous covering of the Pitot tubes (AeroPerù
757) [4] and formations of insect nests inside the static taps
(Birgenair Flight 310) [5] as well as icing of the angle-of-
attack vane (XL Airways Germany Flight 888T) [6]. At pres-
ent, the conventional approach to provide fault tolerance for
flight sensors is based on Hardware Redundancy (HR) [7]
which basically consists in the installation of multiple sen-
sors (initially 4, later reduced to 3) measuring the same
parameter. These sensors are continuously monitored to
check their status, and their values are continuously com-
pared. The use of Built-In-Testing (BIT) voting schemes
allows the detection and the isolation of a faulty sensor. An
alternative approach is given by Analytical Redundancy
(AnR) [8]. AnR basically involves the use of virtual sensors,
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such as conventional state estimators, neural networks, Kal-
man Filters, special cases of Kalman Filters (such as Extended
Kalman Filters and Unscented Kalman Filters), and/or other
predictive models, to provide alternative estimates of the
parameter from the faulty sensor. Recently, an AnR scheme
based on machine learning techniques has been proposed
in [9] for the failure detection and correction of the airspeed
sensor of an aircraft.
Through data from other functional sensors (measuring
parameter highly correlated to the parameter associated with
the faulty sensor) used as inputs, the virtual sensor can esti-
mate the target measurement which when compared with
data provided by the sensor under scrutiny produces the
residual signal. The residual signal is clearly very important
for fault detection purposes; in fact, an alarm status can be
declared when the residual signal exceeds some detection
thresholds. It should be emphasized that the approach pro-
posed in this paper is completely data-driven [10, 11] and
does not require any specific aircraft-dependent dynamic
mathematical model. In summary, the innovative aspects of
this research effort are the complete independence from
any model-based requirement along with the introduction
and the validation of “ad hoc” designed adaptive thresholds
(floating limiters) that are applied to the whitened and fil-
tered residuals with the goal of improving the performance
in terms of fault detectability, fault detection delay, and low
false alarm rate when compared with conventional fixed-
threshold schemes [12–15].
Recently, the authors of this paper have also proposed in
[16] another data-driven approach for the design of robust
fault detection filters for aircraft air data sensors. In [16],
the robustness of the scheme is achieved through the adop-
tion of parametric interval prediction models that are derived
by the solution of a convex optimization problem. Instead, in
the present study, the robustness of the failure detection
scheme was achieved through time-varying fault detection
thresholds that are derived online by a simple floating limiter
filter that is based on the windowed mean and variance of the
whitened residual.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
identification model for the neural networks used in this
study. Section 3 briefly introduces the P92 Tecnam aircraft
from which the flight data were recorded. Section 4 outlines
the data-driven modelling of the true airspeed, angle-of-
attack α, and angle-of-sideslip β sensors. Sections 5 and 6
are dedicated to the analysis of the residuals and to threshold
computation, respectively. Finally, Section 7 provides the
results along with an assessment of the performance of the
proposed scheme in terms of false alarm rate and detection
delay compared with a conventional fixed-threshold fault
detection system.
2. Prediction Model: Feedforward
Neural Network
This section describes the neural network-based model used
for the estimation of airspeed TAS k , α k , and β k as func-
tions of other available measurements. Analytical Redun-
dancy approaches are based on the use of online estimators
that are supposed to provide an estimation of the sensor mea-
surement. Several types of estimators can be found in the lit-
erature, such as Kalman Filters [17], Unscented Kalman
Filters [18], Extended Kalman Filters [19], FIR filter estima-
tor [20], and neural networks adaptive and nonadaptive
[21, 22]. Specifically, in this effort, a nonautoregressive model
[23–25] has been used. The model is essentially a nonlinear
time series model, also known as nonlinear regression [26]
modelled as follows:
y k = f NR X k + ε k , 1
where y k is the y k (target) estimation, X k is the final set
of regressors (see Sections 4 and 5), and ε k is a modelling
error. Note that the NR model does not depend on previous
values ofy k ; this guarantees that the estimation is not
affected by the occurrence of a fault on y k . Thus, the NR
model is able to provide a reliable long-term (multistep ahead)
estimation independently of the occurrence of the fault; on the
contrary, an adaptive model (i.e., NARX model) estimation is
influenced by the previous occurrence of a fault on k .
3. P92 Aircraft and Flight Data
The proposed scheme has been validated using flight data
from the semiautonomous P92 Tecnam aircraft shown in
Figure 1.
The P92 is a general aviation single-engine light aircraft
with a classic high-wing configuration [27]. During the test
flights, the aircraft was remotely controlled through a data
link from a ground station. The on-board pilot was operative
only during the take-off and landing phases. The nominal
aircraft mass is 600 kg (1324 lb); the propulsion is provided
by a Rotax 912 ULS, 74 kW (68 hp) with a two-blade fix pitch
propeller, capable of providing a max cruise speed of 219 km/
h (118 kts) and an operational ceiling of 4267 (14,000 ft). A
total of 8 flights were recorded for approx. 3.5 hours of flight
time. The available flight data were divided into two groups,
that is, training data (used for the goal of training a pseudo-
online learning neural network used as AnR-based virtual
sensors) and validation data (used for the assessment of the
performance of the estimation scheme). Since the recorded
flight data were not completely homogenous, a different
number of flights were used for the robust estimation of the
TAS and of the aerodynamic angles α and β.
For the TAS and β analysis, two flights were used for
training purposes and five flights for validation purposes.
Instead, for the α analysis, two flights were used for training
Figure 1: Semiautonomous P92 Tecnam.
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purposes and six flights for validation purposes. Data statis-
tics for all the flights are shown in Tables 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c).
For all flights (both training and validation), only the
portion of the flight at “cruise” altitude was considered. In
fact, the take-off and the initial climbing, as well as the
descent and the landing, were not considered since they are
associated with specific aerodynamic configurations (includ-
ing, for example, the use of flaps and/or high angles-of-attack
conditions). This decision was made because it was clear that
not enough data were available for training the neural esti-
mators at these conditions since only a few minutes for each
flight are available. Therefore, only flight data with altitude
higher than h k > 250m were considered for the purpose
of this study. The flight parameters were recorded with a
sampling time of TC = 0 1 s.
4. Data-Driven Modeling of the Aircraft
Airspeed Velocity, Angle of Attack, and
Angle of Sideslip
The true airspeed (TAS), the angle of attack (α), and the angle
of sideslip (β) are all estimated as functions of a combination
of measurements from all other sensors (excluding, of course,
TAS, α, and β). Furthermore, the scheme does not require
any information, data, or functional relationships such as
the aircraft equations of motion. In other words, the
approach can be applied without any loss of generality to
any type of aircraft. Thus, the proposed approach can be clas-
sified as “data-driven” instead of “model-driven.” It should
be clarified that in all cases, the GPS velocity was not consid-
ered. In fact, the GPS velocity and the TAS are strongly
related through the relationship gps k + Vwind k = V k .
Therefore, a wind gust could result as an additive fault f t
of the same amplitude.
Thus, TAS, α, and β are estimated as function of other
measurements using the model structure described in Section
2. The initial vector of regressors X k for TAS, α, and β has
been set simply selecting the signals that characterize the air-
craft kinematic and dynamic response as well as considering
the correlation coefficient with the target signal. The resulting
regressors are
XTAS0 k = φ k , ϑ k , ψ k , α k , β k , P k ,Q k ,
R k , Nx k , Ny k , Nz k , δE K ,
δA K , δR K , TTH k , h k , TAIR K ,
Xα0 k = ϑ k , h k , Nx k , Ny k , Nz k ,
P k ,Q k , R k , TAS k , β k , ψ k ,
δE K , δA K , δR K , TTH k , CR k ,
Xβ0 k = h k , Nx k , Ny k , Nz k , P k ,
Q k , R k , TAS k , α k , φ k ,
ϑ k , ψ k , δE K , δA K , δR K ,
Tr k ,W k , CR k ,
2
where ϕ, ϑ, and ψ are the aircraft roll, pitch, and yaw angles,
respectively; α and β are the angles of attack and sideslip,
respectively; P, Q, and R are the aircraft angular rates; Nx,
Ny, and Nz are the axial load factors; δE, δA, and δR are the
elevator, aileron and rudder deflections, respectively; TTH is
the throttle; h is the altitude; TAIR is the air temperature; T
AS is the true aircraft airspeed; CR is the aircraft climbing
rate; Tr is the track angle; and W is the wind direction. Note
that in more general cases, additional control surface deflec-
tions could be introduced.
To cope with possible nonlinearities and dynamic effects,
each vector X k of potential regressors was augmented with
the quadratic terms (only pure quadratic terms were added
and not mixed terms), resulting in
Table 1










TR-FLIGHT-1 37.1 31.3 2.6 34.8
TR-FLIGHT-2 35.5 30.5 1.1 26.8
VAL-FLIGHT-1 37.3 33.4 2.8 16.5
VAL-FLIGHT-2 37.1 32.1 2 17.3
VAL-FLIGHT-3 33.8 31.1 0.7 18
VAL-FLIGHT-4 34.4 31 1.02 28.3
VAL-FLIGHT-5 38 32 1.5 30.8










TR-FLIGHT-1 14.1 6.4 1.9 34.8
TR-FLIGHT-2 12.1 6.3 0.9 26.8
VAL-FLIGHT-1 11.4 4.9 1.7 16.5
VAL-FLIGHT-2 14 5.6 1.4 17.3
VAL-FLIGHT-3 9.3 6.4 0.5 18
VAL-FLIGHT-4 10.3 4.6 1.5 20.3
VAL-FLIGHT-5 9.1 6.2 0.7 28.3
VAL-FLIGHT-6 10.5 5.8 0.9 30.8










TR-FLIGHT-1 2.9 −0.1 1.5 34.8
TR-FLIGHT-2 8.3 0.3 1.4 26.8
VAL-FLIGHT-1 1.6 −0.7 1.1 17.3
VAL-FLIGHT-2 9.8 0.6 1.1 18
VAL-FLIGHT-3 7.1 1.3 1.5 20.3
VAL-FLIGHT-4 6.2 1.5 0.7 19.9
VAL-FLIGHT-5 6.5 0.9 1.2 30.8
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XTAS0 k AUG = XTAS0 k , X
2
TAS0 k , 3
Xα0 k AUG = Xα0 k , X
2
α0 k , 4




A Matlab-based automated procedure known as Stepwise
Selection [28] has been successfully used in this effort for
the selection of the regressors. This scheme iteratively adds
and removes variables relying on the t-statistics of the esti-
mated regression coefficients. Starting from the initial set of
regressors in (3), the final set of selected regressors provided
by the Stepwise Selection procedure is given by
XTAS k = α k ,Q k , R k , Nx k , Nz k ,
TTH k , h k , ψ2 k , α2 k , δE
2 K ,
Xα k = ϑ k , h k , Nx k , Nz k , P k ,Q k ,
TAS k , δR K , TTH k , CR k , Nz2,
TAS2 k , TTH2 k ,
Xβ k = Nx k , Ny k , P k ,Q k , R k ,
TAS k , φ k , δA K , δR K , Tr k ,
W k , Ny2 k , TAS2 k , δR
2 K , δE
2 K
6
Specifically, Figures 2(a)–2(c) show the variable selec-
tion process by the stepwise selection method for the three
sensors. The index of the selected variables is represented
by the red dots in the upper section of each figure while
in the lower section the RMSE prediction error (evaluated
on the training data) as function of the algorithm iteration
is reported.
The correlations between each regressor selected by the
stepwise process and the target signal are reported, for each
of the sensors, in Tables 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c):
6. Multilayer Perceptron Models
The estimation model introduced in Section 2 is given by
y k = f NR X k 7
For each sensor TAS, α, and β, the f NR k function
was mapped through a neural network architecture. After
considering different options, the neural topology selected
for this study is the well-known multilayer perceptron with
one hidden layer. The specific architecture for each neural
approximator is shown in Table 3.
Table 4 summarizes the statistical results achieved for the
training flight data of the residual signals which are defined
as the difference between the real values of the measured sig-
nal and its estimation r k = y k − y k .
In a recent study [16], the authors compared the perfor-
mance of neural network models with those of simple linear
regression models using the same set of regressors. In that
study, it was verified that the mapping performances of the
linear regression models are worse than those provided by
the neural network models. This was the main motivation
of the use of the neural network models in the present
study. A possible motivation of this fact could be that the
unknown identifying functions are not linear in the selected
regressors; therefore, neural estimators work better than
linear regression models.
7. Failure Modeling and Residual Whitening
Failure modeling is a very important task in the overall
design of fault tolerant schemes [29–31]. In the literature,
several fault modeling approaches can be found, such as
bias, freezing, drift, loss of accuracy, and calibration error
[32]. In this effort, without any loss of generality, only
two specific classes of failures have been considered, that is,
step failure and ramp failures to simulate the injection of
hard or soft failures. For each of these cases, the magnitude
of the failure was also varied to test the fault sensitivity.
Clearly, hard and soft failures provide different challenges
in terms of detectability. The residual signal is defined as
the difference between the sensor output and the estimate
of the same signal, that is,
r k = y k − y k 8
At nominal conditions (no fault), the r k signal should
theoretically approach the statistical zero. Unfortunately,
this is not true in practice due to unavoidable system and
measurement noise as well as estimation errors. Thus, the
goals of the fault detection scheme are to detect the occur-
rence of the failure, as soon as possible after its occurrence,
along with the minimization of false alarm rates. From a
detailed statistical analysis, it became evident that the resid-
ual signal is characterized by a high level of autocorrelation
caused by uncertainties at low frequencies and noise.
Therefore, in its raw form, the residual signal is not a suit-
able tool since it contains high levels of colored noise. In
fact, the residual signal should be uncorrelated for optimal
FD. Therefore, a whitening filter has been designed to
remove as much correlation as possible from the residual.
For our purposes, it was assumed, as shown in (9), that the
correlated sequence can be modeled as an autoregressive




di ⋅ r k − i + εr k , 9
where di are AR parameters and εr k is white noise. The
term ∑Ni=1di ⋅ r k − i can be considered as a one-step-ahead
prediction of r k and εr k = r k − r k as the prediction
error. The di parameters were estimated through the Least
Squares method to the mean squared error E2 = L−1∑Lε k
2
of the training data. Then, after the computing of the di
4 International Journal of Aerospace Engineering
parameters, the εr k can be simply derived as output of the
linear filter:
εr z =W FIR z r z , 10
where the discrete time transfer function can be easily
obtained as
W FIR z = 1 − d1z−1 − d2z−2 − d3z−3 − −dNz−N 11
The εr z signal is therefore labeled as “whitened resid-
ual” rW k .
The correct length of the whitening filter was experimen-
tally determined by evaluating rW k for increasing values of
the filter length N , applying the Ljung-Box test [34] to verify
whether the whitened residual exhibits a significant autocor-
relation. Table 5 shows the final values of N selected by this
design process.
A comparison between the residuals before and after the
whitening filtering is shown in Figures 3(a), 3(b), 4(a), 4(b),
5(a), and 5(b).
8. Design of the EWMA Filter
Following the design of the whitening filter, the design of
the fault detection filters was performed using tools from
the statistical process control (SPC). In this context, the
exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) filter is a
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in process variables. The EWMA chart tracks the exponen-
tially weighted moving average mean of all the previous sam-
ples, so that the most recent samples are weighted more
heavily than the previous ones. Even though normality of
the distribution is usually the basic assumption in many
EWMA charts, this chart has exhibited enough robustness
even with non-normally distributed data [35]. The output
of the filter z k is the output of a first-order linear digital
filter taking as input the whitened residual, that is,
z k = 1 − λ ⋅ z k − 1 + λ ⋅ rW k 0 < λ < 1 12
Clearly, the selection of the appropriate value of the
smoothing parameter λ is critical. Larger values of λ are
associated with a larger weight of the current input on
the current output; conversely, smaller values of λ are associ-
ated with larger weights of all the previous input samples on
the current output. The output mean and standard deviation
can be computed, at stationary condition, using (14).







where μ is the mean and σ is the standard deviation.
A standard commonly adopted procedure for the selec-
tion of λ was not found in the literature. In this effort, the
Least Squares method [36] was used, with the goal of finding
an optimized value of λ so that the sum of the sample squared
errors (SSE) of the one-step prediction error ez k = rw k
− z k − 1 is minimized.
Figure 5 shows sample squared errors as function of λ
for the z k EWMA signals produced by the rw k signals
that originate from the three AD models evaluated on the
training data (SSE are all shifted so that SSE 1 = 0 for all
the three filters).
Based on Figure 6, the tuning of the EWMA filter was
performed selecting the value of λ such that the SSE is mini-
mized. Thus, the minimum values of SSE were obtained with
the values of λ in Table 6:
9. Data-Driven Threshold Setting
For FD purposes, conventional approaches include the use
of fixed thresholds or varying (floating) thresholds. Several
studies have been conducted using both the approaches
[12, 13, 37, 38], typically resulting in a trade-off between
them. Fixed thresholds are easier to set since they depend
on a lower number of parameters. On the other hand, fixed
thresholds may not allow detection following the occurrence
of small amplitude failures. The setup of floating thresholds
Table 2
(a) Correlation between selected regressors and TAS
α Q R Nx Nz TTH h ψ2 α2 δE
2
−0.9 0.05 0.13 0.73 0.2 0.35 0.24 −0.83 −0.15 0.36
(b) Correlation between selected regressors and α
ϑ h Nx Nz P Q TAS δR TTH CR Nz2 TAS2 TTH2
0.58 −0.005 −0.64 0.05 0.09 0.15 −0.9 −0.01 −0.4 −0.16 0.06 −0.88 −0.32
(c) Correlation between selected regressors and β
Nx Ny P Q R TAS φ δA δR Tr W Ny2 TAS2 δR
2 δE
2
0.1 0.9 0.1 −0.1 −0.02 0.14 0.1 0.5 0.07 0.007 0.1 −0.4 0.1 0.04 0.12
Table 3: Neural network architectures.
Number of neurons
in the hidden layer
Number and type
of output neurons
TAS K 7 sigmoidal neurons 1 linear neuron
α K 7 sigmoidal neurons 1 linear neuron
β k 8 sigmoidal neurons 1 linear neuron
Table 4: Training performance results. Statistics of residual signals
based on TR-FLIGHT-1 and TR-FLIGHT-2.
Mean (r k ) Std (r k ) Max (r k )
TAS K 3.6 ∗ 10−3 0.1129 1.9240
α K 2.1 ∗ 10−4 0.1030 1.2362
β k −7.5 ∗ 10−6 0.1992 1.8095
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is, of course, more complex; however, they provide in general
more robustness and better performance in terms of detect-
ability, detection delay, and false alarm rate. Clearly, their
success requires a careful design. A typical problem of float-
ing (adaptive) thresholds can be given by an excessively fast
adaptation to the failure that could result in a missed fault
detection. In this effort, floating (adaptive) thresholds [39]
are defined, as follows:
FTUP = z + η ⋅ σ z + b,
FTLOW = z − η ⋅ σ z − b,
15
where z and σ z are the mean value and the standard devi-
ation, respectively, of the EWMA-filtered residual, both com-
puted through a sliding window of length 1800 (180 sec),
while η and b are design parameters. Once again, a standard
procedure for setting η and b could not be found in the liter-
ature; therefore, an “ad hoc” sensitivity study was conducted
using the training data to find the optimal values with the
goal of minimizing false alarms. Specifically, a grid search
was performed over the two parameters, with η in the range
0 to 10 (with a 0.5 step increment) and b in the range 0 to 3
(with a 0.05 step increment). For each grid point, the exper-
imental PFA was computed on the training data retaining
only the couples of values (η and b) leading to an experimen-
tal PFA < 0 0001. Next, between these couples, the best was





Clearly a small value for J implies a small band for the
floating limiter. This is positive from a fault detection
point of view. Table 7 shows the optimized values of η and
b achieved applying the proposed procedure:
The results of this design are summarized in Figures 7(a)–
7(c), where the experimental probability plots derived from
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(b) TAS whitened residual and its autocorrelation
Figure 3
7International Journal of Aerospace Engineering
In each of the Figures 7(a)–7(c), there are three lobes. The
central lobe is the probability distributions of EWMA out-
puts, while the blue lobes are lower threshold probability dis-
tributions and the red lobes are upper threshold probability
distributions. Reducing false alarms requires an intersection
between the probability distribution of the EWMA filter
and the probability distributions of the thresholds as small
as possible. If the EWMA output does not exceed signifi-
cantly the thresholds, this entails that those high false alarm
rates are avoided.
10. Results
Fault detection during validation tests was performed using 5
flights for the true airspeed (TAS), 6 flights for the angle of
attack, and 5 flights for the angle of sideslip. The testing
was conducted in simulated real time using a Simulink
model. For each flight, an artificial additive fault was injected
at t = 700 s with the detectors set using the values of λ, η, and
b reported in Tables 6 and 7. Without any loss of generality,
two failures were considered, that is, a “fast” step and a “slow”
ramp (the duration of the ramp is 10 sec, then for t > 10, the
amplitude remains constant at the value for t = 10; in this
case, for magnitude (or “size”) of the fault, we conventionally
mean the steady state value reached by the fault signal for
t = 10 s) with modeling parameters shown in Table 8.
A critical parameter for a FD scheme is the number of
false alarms. Clearly, a lower false alarm level implies higher
robustness against system and measurement noise. The eval-
uation of the FD scheme was conducted in two steps; in the
first step, the scheme was tested on every validation flight
in a fault-free condition (without injecting any fault). This
is due to the fact that false alarms are independent from the
fault injection; therefore, false alarm rate was evaluated on
the whole length of the flight assuming no fault. During the
second step, a fault was injected to evaluate the detection
delay. Tables 9(a), 9(b), and 9(c) show, for the three sensors,
the number of false alarms in terms of number of samples
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(b) Alpha whitened residual and its autocorrelation
Figure 4
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Figure 6: EWMA tuning.






Table 7: Optimal design of the floating thresholds.
η b PFA
TAS 6 0.005 0.0001
Α 7 0.003 0.0001
Β 7 0.0075 0.0001
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Other critical indexes for assessing the performance of
a FD scheme are the fault detection delay and the mini-
mum amplitude detectable fault. These indexes are defined
as follows:
(i) Fault Detection Delay. This is the time elapsed from
the injection of the fault to the moment when the
detector detects a “true fault.”
(ii) Minimum Amplitude Detectable Fault. This is the
minimum amplitude of the fault that produces the
detection of a “true fault.”
In this study, a fault detection is considered a “true fault”
if, considering an observation period of 60 s following the
















































(c) Threshold design for beta: probability density
Figure 7
Table 8: Step magnitude and ramp slope for fault modeling.
Step (magnitude) 10 s ramp (magnitude)
TAS (m/s) 2 0.2
α (deg) 3 0.3
β (deg) 3 0.3
Table 9









Flight-1 17 7 0.4
Flight-2 17.3 0 0
Flight-3 18 0 0
Flight-4 28.3 0 0
Flight-5 30.8 22 0.6










Flight-1 17 35 0.4
Flight-2 17.3 8 0.3
Flight-3 18 0 0
Flight-4 20.3 34 0.6
Flight-5 28.3 0 0
Flight-6 30.8 56 0.7










Flight-1 17.3 0 0
Flight-2 18 0 0
Flight-3 20.3 40 1.5
Flight-4 19.9 42 1.6
Flight-5 30.8 120 2.2
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duration longer than 4 s during the observation period; oth-
erwise, the detection is considered not reliable and the true
fault is not declared. This logic implies that the minimum
decision time for a fault declaration is 60 seconds.
Tables 10(a), 10(b), and 10(c) show the performance for
TAS, α, and β in terms of detection delay, while Figures 8(a),
8(b), 9(a), 9(b), 10(a), and 10(b) show the threshold evolution
during the injection of the fault.
The minimum amplitude detectable fault was com-
puted by incrementally decreasing the amplitude of the fault
injected until it was no longer possible to declare a “true
fault” within the predefined observation period.
The results for the minimum amplitude detectable faults
are shown in Table 11:
Tables 12(a), 12(b), and 12(c) summarize the perfor-
mance of the FD scheme with the minimum amplitude
detectable along with the associated fault detection delay.
11. Comparison between Adaptive- and Fixed-
Threshold Approaches
As discussed in the literature, a very interesting area of
research is the performance comparison in terms of specific
FD parameters between “fixed” and “adaptive” thresholds.
Considering the fixed-threshold computation approach dis-
cussed in [37] as baseline, in this study, the comparison was
performance using the same training and validation data
for both approaches, reporting the performance in terms of
false alarms and detection delay. For the purpose of being
completely objective and conducting a fair comparison, fixed
thresholds have been computed starting from the residual
signals using the same neural estimators and the same whit-
ening filters to obtain a whitened residual. The difference
between the two approaches starts after the EWMA filtering
(designed with the same λ parameters). In fact, for the fixed-
threshold approach, the EWMA output was processed to find
optimized values for upper and lower limits. In fact, during
the training, the UCL and LCL were derived from data
depending on the desired probability of false alarm PFA,
where the PFA is defined as the probability that z k exceeds
the detection thresholds in a fault-free condition. Defining
F z as the experimental cumulative PDF of z k , the fault
detection thresholds are defined as follows:
UCL =min z F z ≥ 1 − PFA ,
LCL =max z F z ≤ PFA
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PFA = 0 0001 was set the same way in both approaches.
Also, the validation tests were conducted on the same flights
used in Section 10, using the same fault amplitude and the
same injection time for the failure. Tables 13, 14, and 15 show
validation results in terms of false alarms and detection delay:
As far as soft failures are concerned, the detection delay
analysis was performed using the minimum amplitude
detectable fault used in Section 10 and reported in Table 11.
The achieved results are shown in Tables 15(a), 15(b), and
15(c):
Analyzing the results, it is evident that detecting fault
featuring adaptive limiters could save from 0% to 50% of
the time, with the same false alarm rate in the case of hard
failures. Substantially different results were achieved when
comparing the two approaches in the case of soft failures.
In fact, adaptive thresholds allow a much lower detection
delay versus fixed thresholds (up to a ratio of 1 : 30). In
some cases, the occurrence of a soft failure was not even
detected using fixed thresholds.
Note: the study presented in this paper is specifically
focused on the design of experimental FD filters. Therefore,
the problem of fault isolation is not considered at all in the
study. Indeed, if the fault signature matrix for the residuals
for TAS, α, and β are computed, it can be immediately seen
that the three faults are not strongly isolable since each resid-
ual depends on TAS, α, and β. Different approaches can be
used to deal with the fault isolation problem, such as
(1) to perform a fault sensitivity analysis to investigate
whether the fault has a different effect on the ampli-
tudes of three residuals and then exploit this informa-
tion for discriminating the faulty signal.
Table 10
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(b) TAS, zoom on fault detection, ramp fault
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(a) α, zoom on fault detection, step fault
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(a) β, zoom on fault detection, step fault
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(b) β, zoom on fault detection, step fault
at time 700 s injected in Flight-1
Figure 10
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(2) to exclude, a priori, from the set of regressors the
reaming two signals (for instance the regressor set
used for approximating the TAS signal does not
include the α and β signals). In this case, we achieve,
by construction, experimental models that produce a
strong isolable failure signature matrix. Interested
readers are referred to the recent paper by the authors
in [16] where this last approach has been applied.
12. Conclusions
The goal of this study was the design of a robust adaptive
threshold scheme able to deal with failures involving air data
sensors. A completely data-driven approach for the design
and the tuning of the FD schemes for true airspeed, angle-
of-attack, and angle-of-sideslip sensors of an aircraft has
been proposed. It has been shown that, through the use of
this scheme, it is possible to improve significantly the robust-
ness in terms of false alarms and failure detection delay. The
data-driven design philosophy was used in many parts of the
overall FD procedure that is in the regressor selection phase
for the considered sensors, in the design of the withering
and EWMA filters as long as for the computation of detection
thresholds. Validation studies based on actual flight data





TAS (m/s) 0.7 0.07
α (deg) 0.9 0.1
β (deg) 1.3 0.13
Table 12



































(a) Comparison between fixed-threshold and adaptive-threshold

























FL-1 17 7 0.4 5 0.3
FL-2 17.3 0 0 2 0.2
FL-3 18 0 0 0 0
FL-4 28.3 0 0 3 0.2
FL-5 30.8 22 0.6 18 0.5


























FL-1 17 35 0.4 40 0.7
FL-2 17.3 8 0.3 12 0.4
FL-3 18 0 0 2 0.2
FL-4 20.3 34 0.6 40 0.5
FL-5 28.3 0 0 5 0.5
FL-6 30.8 56 0.7 60 1.2

























FL-1 17.3 0 0 5 0.2
FL-2 18 0 0 4 .01
FL-3 20.3 40 1.5 45 1.3
FL-4 19.9 42 1.6 46 1.2
FL-5 30.8 120 2.2 80 0.5
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have shown good overall performance in the presence of hard
and soft failures and the possibility to detect very small
faults. Additionally, a comparison with a fixed-threshold
approach was performed. The results of the comparison
revealed that for hard failures, there is a limited difference
between the approaches. In contrast, a different trend has
been observed in the case of soft failures. Specifically, a signif-
icant detection delay has been observed in the case of fixed
thresholds, leading also to the “no detection at all” situation
in some cases.
The capabilities of this data-driven FD approach coupled
with the flexibility of the adaptive threshold provided by the
floating limiters have proven to be substantially better than
fixed-threshold methods in terms of FD performance. This
last aspect makes the proposed scheme appealing for the
application to a variety of sensor failures for systems where
physical redundancy in the sensors is not available.
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Table 14
(a) Comparison between fixed-threshold and adaptive-threshold


















FL-1 0.4 3.8 0.7 4.8
FL-2 0.4 4.2 0.7 5.7
FL-3 0.5 4.7 0.8 6
FL-4 0.1 4 0.7 6
FL-5 0.4 3.5 0.8 5.6
(b) Comparison between fixed-threshold and adaptive-threshold


















FL-1 0.3 4.0 3.6 9.3
FL-2 0.1 7.1 1.6 7.2
FL-3 0.1 8.0 0.6 5.5
FL-4 0.1 8.3 1.8 7.4
FL-5 0.1 6.9 1.2 6.8
FL-6 0.1 7.2 1.1 6
(c) Comparison between fixed-threshold and adaptive-threshold


















FL-1 2.5 7.5 3 9
FL-2 2.4 7.6 3.6 9
FL-3 0.8 6.5 4.4 10
FL-4 1.7 6.9 6.5 6.8
FL-5 1.6 7.7 3.5 10
Table 15
(a) Comparison between fixed-threshold and adaptive-threshold


















FL-1 3.7 15.4 7.6 19.4
FL-2 1.9 10.1 15.3 19.2
FL-3 10.2 11.3 31.5 30
FL-4 1.9 9.4 16.3 17
FL-5 1.4 13.8 27.8 28
(b) Comparison between fixed-threshold and adaptive-threshold

















FL-1 15.5 15 Not detected 40.9
FL-2 2.8 8.8 86.2 85.6
FL-3 10.4 10.8 10.7 12.6
FL-4 6.2 10.6 41.2 40.8
FL-5 5.5 9.6 Not detected 51.4
FL-6 5.7 18.2 26.7 26
(c) Comparison between fixed-threshold and adaptive-threshold

















FL-1 17.3 18.3 19 20
FL-2 13.1 18.6 21 23
FL-3 15 25.5 43.8 48.1
FL-4 7.6 13.3 5.9 11.2
FL-5 9.8 16.4 46.7 42.8
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